It is possible that an understanding was reached vis-a-vis Hifter’s securing the oil ports against both the Islamic State and Jadhran. Or, more probably, no concrete understanding was reached, but both sides understood a shared interest — and each began to act accordingly.
The emergence of this tacit understanding would have been the final boomerang from the West’s failed engagement with Jadhran. Early this summer, UN special envoy to Libya Martin Kobler tried to buy Jadhran’s support to resume oil exports via his July 21 proposal. This proposal sparked the ire of many, both in Libya and abroad.
The backlash from Kobler’s failed gambit now appears to be a complete reshuffling of the political deck, with Jadhran becoming irrevocably excluded from the negotiating table. Kobler now has his tail between his legs.
His meeting a few days ago with the hard-line, anti-GNA House of Representatives President Ageelah Saleh in Cairo in an attempt to find a new compromise agreement on how to salvage the Libyan Political Agreement highlights his belated shift of policy.
Another potential explanation for this U-turn is the shifting tide of Libyan public opinion toward Hifter and the LNA.
The PC and international backers of the GNA were quick to issue a statement Sept. 12 demanding the LNA’s unconditional withdrawal from the oil crescent ports. The following day, Kobler tried to convince the UN Security Council to issue a new resolution with punitive measures against Hifter. However, he was unsuccessful.