

## 1. The Big Picture

### UNSC resolution ignored; tensions mount & Haftar rallies public support

No de-escalation in sight as the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Government of National Accord (GNA) continue to ready forces for the next round of fighting. Highlighting the stark contrast between political initiatives and the reality on the ground in Libya, levels of military activity continued to increase closely following the recent UN Security Council (UNSC) call for a permanent ceasefire and adoption of Resolution 2509. Violations of the UN arms embargo have become an intractable issue, leading UN Deputy Special Representative to Libya, Stephanie Williams, to refer to the embargo as a “joke”.

On the ground, fighting is now gaining momentum and gradually moving towards - although is yet to reach - levels of military activity seen prior to the 12 Jan truce brokered by Turkey and Russia. The stark contrast between efforts on the diplomatic front and the state of affairs on the ground continues to fuel local sentiment against foreign meddling, which in turn further undermines the credibility of the UN and any stabilization effort led by Ghassan Salame, the head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

Of note, the agenda is full for the coming weeks on the UN political, economic, and military tracks. The Libyan Political Forum is slated for 26 Feb while the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) will resume negotiations on 18 Feb. Meanwhile, all eyes are on the tribal conference in Tarhunah slated for 19-20 Feb and expected to bring together around 5000 attendees. The gathering is significant and could pave the way for a declaration by tribesmen that either rejects or complements UN-led stabilization efforts.

However, based on the limited progress so far and the local bellicose rhetoric, political negotiations are unlikely to deter forces from engaging in a major escalation. As the gap between the negotiating table and the reality in Libya widens, local tribes will grow more frustrated and discredit any peace initiative, choosing instead to continue the fight.

The LNA's participation in negotiations does not guarantee a halt to hostilities. LNA commander Khalifa Haftar could revert to military means with little to no warning. Haftar continues to gain political clout and rally public support. Thousands took to the streets in Benghazi's Al-Keesh Square on 14 Feb in an organized demonstration to oppose foreign intervention in Libya and reiterate support for the LNA's Tripoli offensive. While there have been similar protests recently, the latest mobilization was significant in terms of scale. The demonstration was organized by multiple civil society groups and unions under the banner “the popular movement to stop terrorism”.

A recorded speech of Haftar aired to the demonstrators emphasized the anti-Turkish and anti-foreign intervention rhetoric. Haftar reiterated there will be no peace until

militias and terrorists are disarmed, in a noteworthy comment highlighting LNA intent to continue fighting. The LNA commander added the conflict has reached a point of no return now that LNA forces are closer to liberating Tripoli. The demonstration is the latest in a series of measures by the LNA and Interim government to rally public support and send a clear message to the international community that the civilian population supports Haftar.

Meanwhile, relative progress has been reported on the economic track, though the GNA is likely reluctant to implement drastic reforms that would upend the status quo. For instance, the GNA Ministry of Finance revealed a five-year reform programme aimed at streamlining public finances and increasing transparency on 11 Feb. The move is a clear effort to project intent to reform public finances amid growing pressure from the international community. Observers, however, remain skeptical and have underlined the fact that these measures are only superficial and will do little to change broader structural deficiencies in Libya's economy.

The GNA is facing growing pressure to deliver on the economic front and enact serious reforms to increase transparency and accountability of its public finances. Yet these radical reforms threaten to undermine its very own survival. As a result, the GNA will likely seek to buy time by implementing superficial reforms to ensure its survival in the medium term. This will in turn prompt the LNA to take up arms and revert to military operations on the basis that reforms undertaken by Tripoli are not serious.

In the oil and gas sector, there is no end in sight to the blockade orchestrated by pro-LNA tribesmen. National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman Mustafa Sanalla attempted to lift the blockade with separate meetings with senior US and French officials. However, there is mounting evidence that Sanalla is now having to navigate murky waters and a warmer environment for possible eastern-NOC exports, irrespective of the UN Security Council Resolution 2509 that extended measures against the illicit export of crude. In the absence of a clear-cut condemnation of the blockade, Sanalla reiterated that Washington can make a “decisive difference in Libya”.

On the international front, emerging reports indicate EU countries have agreed to a naval mission to enforce the UN arms embargo but have officially scrapped Operation Sophia. The development is significant in the light of recent Turkish hints at drilling research in its newly-demarcated maritime zone with the GNA. It remains to be seen whether the EU's new naval mission will conflict with the interests of Ankara, especially given Greece's support and reported involvement in the EU mission.

#### KEY POINTS

- Haftar tells Benghazi protesters fight goes on
- UNSC passes Resolution 2509 to enforce ceasefire
- EU agrees new naval mission to uphold embargo



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## 2. National Security Map

Bashagha's convoy targeted in Garabolli; rumours of pro-Assad forces fighting alongside LNA


### Key

#### THREAT INDICATORS

- Severe Threat
- High Threat
- Moderate Threat

#### EVENT INDICATORS

- ★ IED | VBIED
- ♦ Violent Clash
- ▲ Isolated Gunfire
- ▼ Other



Reports indicate unidentified gunmen kidnapped two local men in Sabhā on 10 Feb. The abductees were released from the Wadi al Hayaa District after their relatives paid an unknown ransom on 11 Feb.

LNA spokesperson Ahmed Al-Mesmari claimed a Turkish vessel carrying armoured vehicles and weapons docked at the Port of Misrata. Of note, unconfirmed reports from 10 Feb suggested that an unidentified ship loaded with military vehicles docked at the Port of Misrata.

WB sources confirmed the LNA's 9th Brigade Tarhunah "Al-Kaniat" targeted a convoy of 15 military vehicles affiliated with the GNA's Interior Minister, Fathi Bashagha, near Garabolli Bridge at approximately 1530hrs on 13 Feb. However, there were no confirmed reports of Bashagha's presence in the convoy at the time of the attack. Of note, clashes resumed in Al-Rawajeh area, south of Garabolli, reaching the coastal road after a tactical attack carried out by Al-Kaniat. The latter reportedly advanced and targeted the GNA Interior Ministry military convoy near Garabolli Bridge.

A dispute erupted between two pro-LNA local armed groups resulting in four fatalities and one injury in Sabratah at night on 15 Feb. Initial reports indicate three individuals affiliated with a pro-LNA local armed group known as Al-Ourouba Brigade raided the house of a family affiliated with another pro-LNA local group known as Al-Wadi Battalion. The three attackers and a targeted individual were killed.

Rumours suggest Moscow has begun recruiting pro-Bashar Al-Assad regime forces from Syria to fight alongside the LNA in Libya. The reports were initially spread by Syrian opposition media outlets with no further information to ascertain the veracity of the claims. Middle East publication Asharq Al-Awsat reported 50 pro-Syrian regime forces could be mobilized from eastern Ghouta, Syria, to support the LNA.

Heavy explosions were reported in the western suburbs of Al-Zawiya in the early hours of 13 Feb. Initial reports indicate the explosion occurred in the Abu Issa area. Unconfirmed reports suggest unidentified individuals targeted pro-GNA militias with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGS). Of note, the incident would come 48hrs after an improvised explosive device (IED) intended to target a pro-LNA commander dropping off his daughter at the Al-Jeel As-Saed School, south of Abu Issa, detonated prior to/after the commander arrived at the scene.


LNA airstrikes targeted GNA positions in Abu Grein and Wadi Zamzam in the early hours of 10 Feb.

Unconfirmed reports suggest pro-GNA forces led by GNA Western region commander Osama Juwaili kidnapped a high-ranking Fursan Janzour Battalion member identified as Naji Gnedi as he was travelling from Sabratah toward Alasaba on 09 Feb. Of note, Gnedi is a founding member of the Fursan Janzour Battalion and fled from the battalion's stronghold of Janzur in Apr 2019 following the LNA's offensive on Tripoli. Gnedi has been accused by pro-GNA forces of treason and siding with the LNA in the initial days of the offensive in April 2019.


### 3. Nationwide Security Analysis

Intensified shelling campaign in Tripoli; uptick in sporadic criminal acts in west


Nationwide fatalities by type of attack (Past week)




Nationwide incidents by type of attack (Past week)



Nationwide fatalities by national district (Past week)



Nationwide incidents by national district (Past week)





## Nationwide Fatalities by Type of Attack (Past 27 Weeks)



### Data Analysis

WB recorded this week a total of 13 confirmed deaths in Libya, which compares to 113 deaths reported last week and 24 the week before, marking a sharp decrease in fatalities compared with the past week. The drop in the number of fatalities came as a result of no side of the conflict claiming casualties among its opposers' ranks. In relation to military activity, this week saw three civilian fatalities as a result of an intensified shelling campaign across Tripoli's frontlines marked by 44 mortar/rocket shelling incidents recorded throughout the reporting period; more than double the number recorded last week. The remaining fatalities came as a result of 4 bodies found, 2 assassinations, 2 isolated gunfire cases, 1 robbery attempt and 1 suicide. In addition, violent clashes increased this week with audible explosions heard across the capital as a result of a heavy exchange of artillery fire. Meanwhile, the number of airstrikes conducted stood as parallel to last week with a total of five airstrikes all conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA), including four in the Misrata district and one in Tripoli marking the resumption of airstrikes in the capital following a temporary hiatus. Beyond the clashes, criminal activity remains on an upward trend highlighted by an uptick in robberies in the western region, including vehicle thefts in Tripoli and the theft of electrical wires causing power cuts in the Jfara region. The number of isolated gunfire cases also remained on an upward spiral this week with a total of nine gunfire-related incidents recorded across the country. Meanwhile, this week saw no security incidents recorded in the central region with the majority of incidents spread across the western region. Turning to the south, WB recorded one kidnapping in Sabha, whilst no security incidents were reported beyond the city of Benghazi in the east. Several incidents were recorded throughout the country including 44 mortar/rocket shelling incidents, 33 violent clashes, 28 explosions as a result of intensified shelling, 12 robberies, 9 isolated gunfire cases, 5 airstrikes, 2 protests, 2 kidnappings, 2 assassinations and one IED/VBIED attack.

In western Libya, WB recorded a total of 140 incidents, including 122 in Tripoli, marking a sharp increase in security incidents recorded in the region and across Tripoli largely due to an uptick in violent clashes and an intensified shelling campaign. In Tripoli, beyond military activity, WB sources reported a parked grey Hyundai Elantra was stolen in front of a house in Tripoli's Bab Bin Ghashir area at approximately 0630hrs on 09 Feb. Similarly, reports indicate a parked red KIA Forte 2015 model was stolen in front of a house near Al-Deyafa Fast Food on Zawiya Street at approximately 0600hrs on 10 Feb. Meanwhile, reports indicate a parked grey KIA Sportage was stolen in front of a house on Tripoli's As-Sayidi Street on 10 Feb. Beyond, a parked black Hyundai Elantra was stolen in front of Silphium Family Entertainment Center in Tripoli's Al-Seyaheyya area in the afternoon on 12 Feb. Earlier that morning, a parked white KIA Optima was stolen in front of a house in Tripoli's Al Serraj area. Beyond vehicle thefts, sources reported dozens of oil workers protested in front of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) on the Sekka Road in downtown Tripoli at approximately 1200hrs on 12 Feb. The protest was held in response to the ongoing blockade on key oilfields and terminals in the east and south of Libya.


In the wider western region, sporadic gunfire was reported during land disputes in Gharyan and Zliten, though no casualties were recorded in either incident. Meanwhile, the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) reported an alleged Sub-Saharan African was electrocuted to death after attempting to steal low-pressure electrical wires in Zliten on 11 Feb. Separately, reports indicate a dispute between two members affiliated with Ras Ajdir's Police and Customs Apparatus at the Ras Ajdir Libyan-Tunisian border crossing in the afternoon on 12 Feb. One of the members verbally assaulted a Libyan traveller, prompting the second member to physically assault the first member in an act of retaliation. The dispute ended after other members of the apparatus interfered by firing gunshots into the air. In relation to military activity, reports indicate LNA units targeted GNA positions with indiscriminate shells and an airstrike in Abu Grein in the afternoon on 08 Feb.

Turning to the central region, WB recorded no security incidents throughout the reporting period. Meanwhile, in the southern region, this week saw a drop in security incidents in contrast to last week, with one kidnapping recorded in the Sabha vicinity on 10 Feb.

In the East, WB recorded 7 incidents across Benghazi, including 3 arrests, 2 gunfire-related incidents, 1 pro-LNA protest & the removal of explosive remnants of war (ERW). No additional incidents were recorded beyond the city of Benghazi.

## 4. Tripoli Neighborhood Report

UAV strike targets Bab Tajoura Battalion; shelling disrupts air traffic at MJI



### KEY INCIDENTS

1. (09 Feb) Municipality of Qasr Bin Ghashir suspends classes due to shelling
2. (09 Feb) Vehicle theft in Bab Bin Ghashir
3. (10 Feb) Vehicle theft on Zawiya Street
4. (10 Feb) Vehicle theft on As-Sayidi Street
5. (10-11 Feb) LNA reinforcements arrive from Bin Jawad & Tripoli
6. (10 Feb) GNA-affiliated Capital's Storm deploy forces across central areas
7. (11 Feb) UAV airstrike targets Bab Tajoura Battalion; no casualties recorded
8. (11 Feb) GNA ministerial meeting discusses Tripoli security arrangements
9. (12 Feb) Shells land on café on Al-Shok Road; one killed and nine injured
10. (12 Feb) Shells land near rear gate of Tripoli University injuring three
11. (12 Feb) Oil workers protest against blockade in front of NOC
12. (12 Feb) Vehicle thefts in Al-Seyaheyya and Al-Serraj areas
13. (13 Feb) Man found killed in An-Najila
14. (14-16 Feb) UNSC ceasefire call on ground amid tensions & build up

### Shelling disrupts air traffic at MJI

Shells landed in Mitiga International Airport (MJI) and some residential units in Shurfat Al Malaha at approximately 1300hrs. Reports suggest air traffic at MJI was temporarily suspended before resuming at approximately 1700hrs.

### UAV strike targets Bab Tajoura Battalion

A return of airstrikes conducted in Tripoli was marked by unattributed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) airstrikes targeting the Government of National Accord (GNA)-aligned Bab Tajoura Battalion HQ, where two missiles landed on the HQ and another on the Bab Tajoura Cemetery at approximately 2200hrs on 11 Feb. No fatalities or casualties were recorded. WB sources reported that the HQ is unoccupied, where the battalion has a camp located in the Ben Ashour area.

### Intensified shelling causes casualties

The combat theatre continues to be dominated by intermittent skirmishes and growing reliance on heavy artillery shelling. At approximately 1800hrs on 12 Feb, an indiscriminate shell landed on a cafe near the Mazaya Market on Al-Shok Road killing a man and the injuring nine others. The incident was corroborated by the GNA's Volcano of Rage Media centre identifying the civilian killed as 38-year-old Ali Al-Jafayeri and claimed that two Tripoli Medical Centre Staff were among the nine injured. Earlier that day at approximately 1230hrs, indiscriminate shelling targeted Al-Hadba Al-Sharqiya "eastern Hadba". Initial reports

indicate a shell landed in front of a shop near the rear gate of Tripoli University resulting in the injuries of three men. Unconfirmed reports suggest a fourth man was killed, whilst the GNA's Volcano of Rage Operation claimed that five civilians were wounded. On 13 Feb, indiscriminate shelling targeting Tripoli University and Al-Batata killed a woman at approximately 1200hrs. On 14 Feb, shells landed on Al-Baeish killing a man at approximately 2130hrs.

### Man found killed in An-Najila


On 13 Feb, a young man was found killed in An-Najila area with signs of a gunshot to the head. Initial reports indicate unidentified gunmen carjacked his vehicle in the area.

### Ninth anniversary of 17 February Revolution

Starting from 16 Feb, all roads leading to Martyrs' Square in Tripoli's downtown area will be closed by police vehicles affiliated with the "Capital's Storm" (Asefat Al-Asema) force affiliated with the Tripoli Security Directorate as part of security arrangements ahead of the celebrations of the ninth anniversary of Libya's 17 February Revolution. Of note, thousands of people commonly gather at Martyrs' Square to commemorate the 17 February Revolution every year and a musical event is held. WB strongly advises travellers to avoid the Martyrs' Square vicinity throughout the day of 17 Feb. Whilst previous 17 Feb celebrations proceeded with no significant security incidents, the current context of divisions within the GNA, including between pro-Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) elements and more moderate factions, increases the likelihood of security incidents.

## 5. Benghazi Neighborhood Report

Drive-by shooting targets large pro-LNA demonstration; police targeted during raid



### KEY INCIDENTS

1. (10 Feb) LNA's Saiqa Special Force mobilise from Benghazi toward Tripoli
2. (10 Feb) Hand grenade & four shells removed in ERW removal campaign
3. (11 Feb) Prominent criminal gang open fire on police during raid
4. (12 Feb) Haftar receives French FM official; Macron extends invitation to Haftar to visit Paris
5. (13 Feb) Haftar receives Italian FM in Ar-Rajmah
6. (13 Feb) Chadian gang involved in robberies arrested in Bouatni
7. (14 Feb) Drive-by shooting targets large pro-LNA demonstration in Al-Keesh Square; no casualties

### Police members targeted during raid

The Interim Government's Ministry of Interior (MoI) reported a non-commissioned officer of the Rescue Police Department, Mohammed Al-Menfi, was killed and the Department's head, Jamal Al-Amami, was wounded in an exchange of gunfire during a raid targeting a prominent criminal gang involved in coerced robbery in Benghazi on 11 Feb. The criminal gang consisted of Libyan and Egyptian nationals and were active in areas including Ard Shabana, Budzirah and Ard Al-Ahlam. Al-Amami moved towards the suspects' location in Shabana Al-Rabish area, specifically in the internal roads leading to the village, after which the gang members opened fire on the security forces resulting in skirmishes between the two sides.

### Shots fired during pro-LNA demonstration

Thousands took to the streets in Benghazi's Al-Keesh Square on 14 Feb in an organized demonstration to oppose foreign intervention in Libya and reiterate support for the LNA's Tripoli offensive. While there have been similar protests recently, the latest mobilization was significant in terms of scale. The demonstration was organized by multiple civil society groups and unions under the banner "the popular movement to stop terrorism".

Meanwhile, a drive-by shooting targeting the pro-LNA public mobilization in Benghazi's Al-Keesh Square, shortly after the demonstration

ended and a musical event was being held on-stage. The gunfire resulted in a state of panic among locals, though no casualties have been reported. The unidentified perpetrators were intercepted by local security forces. The musical event continued shortly after the incident.

### Chadian criminals arrested in Bouatni

Benghazi's Security Directorate arrested a Chadian gang involved in robberies in Benghazi's Bouatni area on 13 Feb. The arrest came after a local filed a complaint about the theft of furniture and air conditioners from homes he owned in the area. Following interrogations, the suspects confessed to the charges against them and disclosed that they operate in cooperation with Libyan citizens to whom they sell their stolen items to. The suspects reported that one of the Libyan citizens lives in Al-Fuwaihat's Pepsi Street after which the police prepared an ambush and arrested the suspect alongside another individual.



## 6. What's next

### Tarhunah tribal conference opposes UN-led initiatives as fighting intensifies

#### POLITICAL FORECAST

Politically, the UNSC Resolution 2509 will likely continue to be ignored and ceasefire prospects remain shrouded in uncertainty. This was clearly highlighted in a statement by Russia's Foreign Ministry, described the Resolution as rushed and containing "ill-balanced provisions". Russia, which abstained from voting, is of the view that a ceasefire needs to be negotiated before potentially imposing sanctions for violating something that does not effectively exist (in reference to the ceasefire). As assessed by WB in previous reports, Russia will take credit for brokering a ceasefire but pass the baton to the EU and UN to fix the political impasse that prevailed before Haftar's offensive. Russia's position will then fluctuate between active support for Haftar and a more passive mediator role. When negotiations are unfolding, Russia will seek to secure its interests by exerting pressure on parties to the conflict. If there are major disagreements or the EU encounters roadblocks, all parties will be compelled to revert back to Moscow for mediation. This architecture will enable Moscow to preserve its image as a powerbroker and mediator to the conflict. Domestically, the House of Representatives (HoR) speaker, Aguila Saleh, invited HoR deputies and members to meet on 18 Feb for an "important session" to be held in Tobruk. The session could result in new decrees being enacted to support the LNA's military operations. More specifically, there is a possibility the session will officially announce its position on the UN-led Libyan Political Forum in Geneva slated for 26 Feb. In his latest briefing to the Security Council, Salame noted that deep divisions within the HoR have been impeding the selection of candidates to attend the political track meetings. It remains to be seen whether the HoR will endorse or reject the Geneva meeting.

#### WHAT OTHER EXPERTS SAY

Umberto Profazio and Amanda Lapo for the *International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)* provide an in-depth analysis of the situation on in Libya and argue the prospect of a resolution appear dismal. The authors argue the disconnect between political initiative and the reality on the ground highlights the two separate arenas where fighting is unfolding in the Libyan conflict. The authors explore dimensions of the conflict such as Haftar's advantage in negotiations, violations of the UN arms embargo, and divisions within the international community. The authors conclude by stating "Although regional diplomacy and international conferences are undoubtedly worthy efforts, the absence of a meaningful ceasefire makes the prospect of a workable solution to Libya's conflict appear dismal. Any lasting deal is contingent on a genuine commitment to the truce by the parties on the ground and the implementation of effective measures to enforce the arms embargo. The United Nations is currently pushing on both fronts, by facilitating a special committee made up of five military officials from each warring side and passing a resolution aimed at imposing sanctions on countries that break the arms embargo. Whether these endeavours will produce any tangible result, or become another failed attempt at reconciliation, has yet to be seen.

#### SECURITY FORECAST

The combat theatre continues to be dominated by intermittent skirmishes and growing reliance on heavy artillery shelling. Military activity was dominated by a resumption of airstrikes in Tripoli after an unidentified UAV targeted the pro-GNA Bab Tajoura Battalion HQ, where two missiles landed on the emptied HQ and another on nearby Bab Tajoura Cemetery at approximately 2200hrs on 11 Feb. In Tripoli, the newly-established "Capital's Storm" (Asefat Al-Asema) has been tasked with strengthening security across the capital. The deployment is indicative of the prevailing tensions between armed groups across the capital. Meanwhile, Al-Zawiya's Abu Issa area has seen an uptick in incidents as a direct result of tensions between LNA and GNA groups in the area after pro-LNA forces expanded their presence. Tensions are high in the area and the area could see skirmishes and targeted assassinations against key commanders, including with the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Meanwhile, the Tarhunah tribal conference on 19-20 Feb could result in sporadic security incidents targeting attendees, especially given tribal tensions between Tarhunah and pro-GNA Misrata factions. Pro-LNA and pro-GNA factions will continue to compete in the medium term for control of Gharabolli and other strategic nodes. The context of negotiations could prompt pro-GNA forces to mount an offensive eastward to recapture Sirte from the Abugrein frontline. Ultimately, splintering will continue to plague the GNA in the medium term. Assassinations, defections, politically-charged statements, are all set to increase and will undermine the Tripoli government's posture in Tripoli and across the West. The LNA could engage in tactical operations to assassinate key figures, as recently highlighted by the LNA's 9th Brigade Tarhunah "Al-Kaniat" operating targeting Bashagha's convoy in Gharabolli.

#### LIBYANS AND THE ARAB STREET

Writing for *The Arab Weekly*, John C.K. Daly explores the recent tensions between Ankara and Moscow over Syria, and by extension the Libyan theatre. The spate of tensions between the two was prompted by Syrian Army advances on the remaining rebel-held Idlib with Russian air cover. Relations between the two reached a low point, corroborated by the rhetoric and tit-for-tat comments from both sides. The question ahead is whether there will be a spillover from these tensions into Libya, another key issue of bilateral concern. The author argues "Even if Putin and Erdogan reconcile their interests in Syria, events in Libya have the potential to further harm their bilateral relationship. Erdogan backs the Islamist-dominated government in Tripoli, supported by Western powers in the United Nations, against the rebel army led by Field-Marshal Khalifa Haftar and supported by Russia that controls most of the country. The troops sent by Erdogan are Syrian Arabs, part of the same surrogate proxy forces that he used to invade Kurdish northern Syria. Besides worsening relations with Russia, Erdogan's Libyan intervention could find Turkey confronting France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, all of which back Haftar, as well."

# About Whispering Bell



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